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Executive Summary  
 
Litigation is a method that people seek to avoid. It is expensive, time consuming, emotionally 
draining and unpredictable. Thus, alternative dispute resolution mechanisms, such as arbitration 
and mediation, are becoming more and more popular.  
 
As far as mediation is concerned, when a settlement agreement is reached, parties often 
voluntarily abide by its terms, but sometimes fail to do so. The absence of an international cross-
border mechanism to enforce the settlement agreement resulting from mediation was therefore 
seen as one of mediation’s major flaws. More precisely, in order to enforce the settlement 
agreement resulting from mediation, it was necessary either to homologate it by a notary or a 
judge so it can be embodied in an authentic instrument or a judgment, or to file an action for 
breach of contract before the competent authority. 
 
In order to overcome this hurdle, and along with the enactment of harmonised international and 
regional legal instruments regulating mediation, the Convention on International Settlement 
Agreements Resulting from Mediation was crafted (referred to as the Singapore Convention or 
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It opened for signature on 7 August 2019, has been signed by 52 States so far, including the 
world’s largest economies – the US and China, and 3 of the 4 largest economies in Asia – China, 
India and South Korea. It has been ratified on 25 February 2020 by the Singapore and Fiji Islands 
States and on 12 March 2020 by Qatar. With Qatar's ratification, the Convention will enter into 
force on 12 September 2020. Saudi Arabia then ratified the Convention on May 5 2020. 
 
It has been described as the long awaited “missing piece” for the development of mediation in 
commercial disputes, and is fully in line with the more general trend towards the development of 
a settled justice. 
 
The Convention provides for a legal framework aiming at the promotion of the international 
enforceability of settlement agreements, and is comparable to the New York Convention on the 
recognition and enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards. Therefrom, arbitration’s biggest fear 
became to lose its status as the most preferred form of alternative dispute resolution mechanism.  
Actually, considering that the enforceability of arbitral awards is usually ranked as arbitration 
most important feature, ensuring the enforceability of settlements resulting from mediation via 
the Singapore Convention will probably lead to a competitive synergy between the two 
mechanisms, even if parties can choose instead to combine the “best of both worlds” through the 
conclusion of “med-arb protocols”.  
 
The entry into force of the Singapore Convention on 12 September 2020 will also increase the 
use of mediation in international business relationships within the region of Asia-Pacific and on 
the road and maritime routes of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), notably in the construction 
and the shipping industries, in which the complexity of the disputes and the technical issues to 
be addressed are better resolved through a mediation process rather than an arbitration procedure, 
let alone a litigation before the State Courts.  
 
In the same vein, the Singapore Convention will encourage national jurisdictions to integrate 
mediation into their litigation process, as a prerequisite for admissibility, and mediation will be 








As regards the ratione materiae of the Convention, and insofar as the expression “commercial 
disputes” contained therein has not been defined, there is room for a broad interpretation: it could 
be envisaged to extend the Singapore Convention’s scope to investor-State disputes, and hence 
reduce the time and cost inefficiency as well as the lack of predictability of the solutions that the 
arbitration process usually generates.  
 
After recalling the circumstances that gave birth to the Singapore Convention (1.), this article 
will focus on the future of arbitration after the signing of the Singapore Convention (2.), the 
impact of the latter on the widespread of mediation in business relationships worldwide (3.), as 
well as its application to investor-State disputes (4.). These developments support the conclusion 
that, inevitably, the Singapore Convention will alter the landscape of alternative dispute 
resolution in international commercial transactions of all kind, together with the legal 
organization by the States of their mediation and enforcement systems (5.). 
 
1. Introduction  
 
1.1. The need of a harmonized international legal framework for commercial mediation  
 
Over the past decade, the resolution of international commercial disputes through mediation has 
gained momentum among practitioners, academics and States.2 However, such development has 
been confronted with practical issues resulting from the essence of mediation. In fact, since 
agreements reached through mediation are mere contracts and not court decisions, they cannot 
be automatically enforced in cross-border disputes in the absence of an international legal 
framework.3 
 
The enforcement of the settlements resulting from mediation is thus conditioned by a legal action 
for contractual liability before the national courts or arbitral tribunals. In addition to this first 
hurdle, in some legal systems, mediation is not widely spread and does not benefit from a set of 
well-established rules, which contributes to a lack of understanding of the mechanism and, 




2  Preamble of the Singapore Convention: “The Parties to this Convention, noting that mediation is 
increasingly used in international and domestic commercial practice as an alternative to litigation, have 
agreed […]” 
 
3  Caroline Deveaux, Convention de Singapour : les enjeux pour la médiation commerciale internationale, 
36 Recueil Dalloz 2032 (2019). 
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In order to tackle these problems, the international community endeavoured to find appropriate 
and realistic solutions taking into account the differences between the various legal systems.  
 
Within this context, it has been suggested to enact harmonised international and regional legal 
instruments providing for the mechanism of mediation, solution previously approved by a vast 
majority of practitioners. Such approval has also been reflected in a 2014 survey conducted by 
the International Mediation Institute4 (referred to as IMI), the results of which showed that 93 
per cent of the participants would be more keen on mediating a dispute with a party from another 
country if the latter had ratified a Convention on the enforcement of settlement agreements 
resulting from mediation.5 Hence, a significant number of recent international treaties have been 
concluded, thus contributing to the harmonisation of the legal framework applicable to mediation 
(e.g. the Uniform Act on Mediation adopted by the Organisation pour l’harmonisation en 
Afrique du droit des affaires – referred to as OHADA – on November 20176; the EU Directive 
2008/52/EC). 
 
In that respect, the most significant step towards such harmonisation and promotion of the 
enforcement and recognition of settlements reached through mediation is undoubtedly the 
Convention on International Settlement Agreements Resulting from Mediation7 (hereinafter 
referred to as the Singapore Convention or the Convention). The Convention was adopted on 20 
December 2018 and opened for signature on 7 August 2019. It has been signed by 52 States so 
far, including the world’s largest economies, the US and China, and 3 of the 4 largest economies 
in Asia, i.e. China, India and South Korea. It has been ratified on 25 February 2020 by Singapore 
and the Fiji Islands States. For entering into force, the Singapore Convention needed a third 
instrument of ratification that eventually was deposited by Qatar at the UN Headaquarters in New 




4  A non-profit public interest initiative to drive transparency and high competency standards into mediation 
practice across all fields, worldwide. 
 
5  International Mediation Institute, IMI survey results overview: How Users View the Proposal for a UN 




 6  Uniform Act on Mediation adopted by OHADA on November 2017, also available at 
https://www.ohada.org/attachments/article/2292/Acte-Uniforme-sur-la-Mediation.pdf 
 
7  Also known as the Singapore Convention on Mediation. 
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Therefore, in accordance with Article 14(1), the Singapore Convention shall effectively enter 
into force six months after deposit of the third ratification, on 12 September 2020.8 
 
Surprisingly, the European Union has not yet signed the Singapore Convention neither did Japan 
and Russia. In fact, it remains unsettled, inter alia, whether it is the European Union as a stand-
alone entity that is competent to sign the Convention or rather its Member States individually. 
More to the point, and as far as Japan is concerned, it decided to adopt a neutral position for the 
time being and observe its application in practice by refraining from the ratification of the 
Convention. 
 
Furthermore, as it has been pointed out by some prominent scholars9 that the Singapore 
Convention is not, in its current state, compatible with the existing legal framework for 
compulsory enforcement, on one hand, and the alternative dispute resolution regulations, on the 
other hand.10 Regarding Russia, in which mediation does not constitute a common method of 
dispute resolution, academics acknowledge that the implementation of the Singapore Convention 
would contribute not only to the development of mediation, in particular, but also of the Russian 
legal system as a whole. 
 
Looking at its prodromal stages, the first initiative for the enactment of the Singapore Convention 
was taken in 2015, when the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (referred 
to as UNCITRAL), following the United States’ suggestion to mandate the Working Group II - 
Arbitration and Conciliation/Dispute Settlement (referred to as the Working Group II) to start 




8  See, for further information, press release of the UNCITRAL Commission on International trade Law 
available at https://lnkd.in/g7BMkqp  
 
9  Reference is made to Prof. Kaiuchi, who sustained this idea during the 2nd Asia Pacific Conference, held 
on 2 August 2019. 
 
10  Olivia Sommerville, Singapore Convention Series – Strategies of China, Japan, Korea and Russia, 16 
September 2019  Kluwer Mediation Blog also available at 
http://mediationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2019/09/16/singapore-Convention-series-strategies-of-china-
japan-korea-and-russia/. More precisely, the Japanese Civil Execution Act 1990 provides that compulsory 
execution of a specific performance of a civil or commercial claim can be requested only where the party 
concerned has in its possession a title of obligation. However, under the same Act, mediated agreement 
settlements are not listed as enforceable titles of obligations. As regards the second incompatibility, the 
Japanese ADR Act 2004 requests the mediated agreements to result from a certified mediation service 
contrary to the Singapore Convention which does not require any such certification.  
 
11  Official Records of the General Assembly, Seventieth Session, Supplement No. 17 (A/70/17), paras. 135-
142. 
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The only firm opposition towards this initiative came from the European Union which expressed 
a general scepticism with regards to the need of harmonisation. It actually pointed out the 
impossibility of reaching a consensus on the elected approach and expressed its preference to 
leave the issue of enforcement of settlement agreements resulting from mediation to domestic 
laws.12  
 
As the Working Group II restated during the panel discussion in the Singapore Convention 
signing ceremony and conference on 7 August 2019, the initiation of the Convention was driven 
by the need to promote mediation among the potential users by respecting at the same time the 
diversity of the cultural and legal traditions of the Contracting States.13 
 
1.2. The Singapore Convention on mediation: the missing third piece in the international 
dispute resolution enforcement framework 
 
To quote the Prime Minister of Singapore, Lee Hsien Loong, “The Singapore Convention on 
Mediation is the missing third piece in the international dispute resolution enforcement 
framework”.14 During the aforementioned ceremony, he also highlighted the fact that the 
Convention is a powerful statement in support of multilateralism, i.e. the coordination of national 




12  Intervention of the European Union, in Audio Recording: U.N. Commission on International Trade Law, 
48th Session (United Nations 2015), 2 July 2015, 9:30-12:30, 
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/audio/meetings.jsp.  
 
13  Sophie Tkemaladze, We Have the Law! We Signed the Convention! What’s next? 30 September 2019 
Kluwer Mediation Blog. 
 
14  Speech by Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong at Singapore Convention Signing Ceremony and Conference, 
7 August 2019, available at https://www.pmo.gov.sg/Newsroom/PM-Lee-Hsien-Loong-at-Singapore-
Convention-Signing-Ceremony-and-Conference.  
 
15  As José E. Alvarez expressed it poetically, “multilateralism is our shared secular religion” (José E. 
Alvarez, Multilateralism and Its Discontents, in 11 European Journ. of Int’l Law 393-394 (2000). In fact, 
multilateralism is one of the existing approaches to foreign affairs defined as the practice of coordinating 
national policies in groups of three or more states (Robert O. Keohane, Multilateralism: An Agenda for 
Research, in 45 International Journal 731 (1990). At an international level, the multilateral cooperation is 
materialised through the establishment of multilateral organisations and institutions and the elaboration of 
multilateral legal instruments. Multilateral treaties, as opposed to bilateral ones - concluded only between 
two states, invite the international community at large to join them, and thus, at least in aspiration, aim at 
universal participation. 
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In the same vein, Stephen Mathias, UN Assistant Secretary-General for Legal Affairs, noted that 
“the Convention establishes mediation as a credible and effective path for commercial parties, 
to not only resolve commercial disputes, but to preserve their long-term relationships”.16  
 
In fact, the Convention establishes an international legal framework applicable to the 
enforcement of settlements resulting from mediation, which could be compared to the legal 
framework established by the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign 
Arbitral Awards of 1958 (referred to as the New-York Convention17). This definitely constitutes 
a milestone in the development of mediation. 
 
More precisely, the Singapore Convention is designed as a tool by which the Contracting States 
(and their respective jurisdiction) undertake the obligation to modify their legal systems in order 
to implement the Convention as of 12 September 2020 and thus, to further strengthen the role of 
commercial mediation as a dispute resolution mechanism.  
 
The Convention is therefore fully in line with the more general trend towards the development 
of a settled justice and meets the economic players’ demands for a more structured legal 
framework.  
 
As regards the scope of the Convention, it applies to international agreements resulting from 
mediation and concluded in writing by parties to resolve a commercial dispute.18 Both the broad 
definition of mediation19 and the limited number of required formalities provided for in the 
Convention reflect the general will of the Contracting States to eliminate the potential 
impediments to the circulation of the settlements resulting from mediation and allow the proper 
functioning of the Convention.20 
 
 
16  Zheng Chengqiong, New UN Treaty on Mediation Signed in Singapore, in China.org.cn, 7 August 2019, 
available at: http://www.china.org.cn/world/2019-08/07/content_75076360.htm. 
 
17  Adopted by the United Nations diplomatic conference on June 10, 1958 and entered into force on 7 June 
1959. https://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/NY-conv/New-York-Convention-E.pdf. 
 
18  Art. 1 (1) of the United Nations Convention on International Settlement Agreements Resulting from 
Mediation. 
 
19  The Convention defines mediation as “a process, irrespective of the expression used or the basis upon 
which the process is carried out, whereby parties attempt to reach an amicable settlement of their dispute 
with the assistance of a third person or persons (“the mediator”) lacking the authority to impose a solution 
upon the parties to the dispute.”(article 2(3) of the Singapore Convention). 
 
20  Intervention of the Chair, in UNCITRAL Audio Recordings: Working Group II (Arbitration and 
Conciliation), 64th Session, 3 Februrary 2016, 10:00-13:00, 
https://icms.unov.org/CarbonWeb/public/uncitral/speakerslog/3e4f5de6-6aec-45bc-bd1ea419612128a5.  
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The Convention excludes settlement agreements (a) that have been approved by a court or have 
been concluded in the course of court proceedings; (b) which are enforceable as a judgment in 
the state of that court or (c) that have been recorded and are enforceable as an arbitral award.21 
This issue has been discussed at length during the preparatory works and the solution adopted by 
the Working Group II finally crystallised its will to opt for a compromise.  
 
In fact, it has been argued that this exclusion constituted an attempt to avoid creating an overlap 
with other widely accepted international instruments such as the New York Convention and the 
Hague convention on the choice of court agreements of 2005 (referred to as the Hague 
Convention on the Choice of Court Agreement)22 that specifically govern those types of 
settlement agreements.23 However, it has been noted that there was no need for such exclusion 
given that the aforementioned Conventions provide for a minimum protection, by “setting floors 
rather than ceilings”.24 Thus, the Contracting States are free to provide greater protection than 
the one required by the various treaties in the sense that there will be no direct conflict between 
the treaties’ obligations and rights.  
 
After detailing the inception of the Singapore Convention, the article will focus on the future of 
arbitration after the signing of the Singapore Convention (2.), the impact of the Convention on 
the widespread of mediation in business relationships worldwide (3.) and the application of the 
Convention to investor-State disputes (4.). These developments support the conclusion that, 
inevitably, the Singapore Convention will alter the landscape of alternative dispute resolution in 
international commercial transactions of all kind, together with the legal organization by the 







21  Art. 1 (3) of the United Nations Convention on International Settlement Agreements Resulting from 
Mediation. 
 
22  Adopted by the Hague Conference Private International Law on 30 June 2005 and entered into force on 1 
October, 2005, available at https://assets.hcch.net/docs/510bc238-7318-47ed-9ed5-e0972510d98b.pdf 
 
23  Nadja Alexander, Singapore Convention on Mediation,  24 July 2018 Kluwer Mediation Blog  available at 
http://mediationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2018/07/24/singapore-Convention-mediation/. 
 
24  Timothy Schnabel, The Singapore Convention on Mediation: A Framework for the Cross-Border 
Recognition and Enforcement of Mediated Settlements, 1 Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journ. 24-
27 (2019). 
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2. The fate of arbitration after the signing of the Singapore Convention  
 
In order to answer whether mediation will steal some light from arbitration (2.4) or whether it 
would be more appropriate to combine the best of both worlds (2.5), we will first briefly recall 
the historical background of arbitration’s genesis (2.1), state the reasons behind its success (2.2) 
and compare arbitration – as a well-established resolution mechanism – with mediation (2.3). 
 
2.1. Brief historical background of the genesis of arbitration 
 
Arbitration has its roots in ancient Greece and in ancient Rome. With the development of trade 
among ancient cities, arbitral tribunals were created within the fairs and market places in order 
to settle, in an expedited way, the disputes between merchants. It was a very efficient mechanism 
insofar as the party who did not comply with the arbitral award was expelled from the market 
place.25 
 
Promoting arbitration as a dispute resolution mechanism depended on the good or bad 
relationship that politicians held with judges. More precisely, when animosity prevailed, the 
legislator favoured arbitration, whereas when amicable bonds were established, arbitration was 
promoted. For instance, in the 16th and 18th centuries, in many European countries, such as 
France, the legislator favoured arbitration notably for disputes between merchants, family 
members or company partners.26 
 
Traders who feared national jurisdictions of their counterparts (as they were unable to appoint 
neutral adjudicators since arbitration was prohibited) became reluctant to concluded transactions 
and international trade suffered therefrom. In an attempt to safeguard international trade, 
arbitration was reintroduced in the panel of dispute resolution mechanisms. At first, it was 
allowed only in an international context and in commercial disputes. Thereafter, arbitration’s 
scope expanded, to almost encompass all types of disputes. Nowadays, despite some slight 
differences between international and domestic arbitration on one hand, and between commercial 
and civil arbitration on the other hand, arbitration is no longer seen as a rival to state justice 




25  Christophe Seraglini, Jérome Ortsheidt, Droit de l’Arbitrage Interne et International, §§ 38-43 
(Montchrestien, 2013). See also, Jean-Baptiste Racine, Droit de l’Arbitrage, §25 (PUF, 2016). 
 
26  Ibid. 
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Actually, according to the International Chamber of Commerce (referred to as ICC) statistics of 
201827, 2,282 parties were involved in ICC Arbitration cases from 135 countries and new 
registered cases represented an aggregate value of US$ 36 billion, with an average amount of 
US$ 45 million in dispute, 60% of which had an amount in dispute over US$2 million. 
 
2.2. Reasons behind arbitration’s success28 
 
It was said that arbitration had everything that state justice did not have: time efficiency, cost 
efficiency, neutrality, confidentiality, flexibility and customization to the users’ needs. Are these 
advantages material and do they still stand in light of today’s practice? 
 
The absence of a double degree of jurisdiction renders arbitration time efficient insofar as the 
arbitral tribunal issues a final and binding award. However, all arbitration statutes provide for a 
recourse against the award, operating as a sort of appeal, and therefore as a second degree of 
jurisdiction. It has been argued that arbitrators are generally more available than state judges who 
are compelled to handle several cases at a time. However, it has been observed that the same 
arbitrators are often appointed and this very fact renders them less available and “overbooked”. 
On another note, the fact that it is possible to appoint an expert to sit as arbitrator avoids resorting 
to tribunal appointed experts. This being said, experts are frequently appointed during arbitration 
procedures, either by the parties or the arbitrators themselves. In addition, even though parties 
can freely set a reasonable time limit for rendering the award, they often request time extensions 
and struggle to coordinate their calendars with the counsels and arbitrators (in order to set a 
hearing date), not to mention their excessive recourse to state judges (either to the “juge d’appui”, 
the “juge d’annulation” or the “juge de l’exécution”) which lengthen the procedure. 
 
As regards the cost efficiency of arbitration in comparison with litigation costs, nowadays, 
expenditures became arbitration’s biggest flaw: in addition to counsels’ fees, parties must pay 
arbitrators’ fees and expenses, arbitration institution’s fees, as well as additional costs related to 






27  See https://iccwbo.org/media-wall/news-speeches/icc-arbitration-figures-reveal-new-record-cases-awards-
2018/. 
 
28  Christophe Seraglini, Jérome Ortsheidt, op.cit., §§44-54. See also, Jean-Baptiste Racine, op.cit., §§85-98. 
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Although a party’s state judge should not be seen as partial, a party and its state judge will both 
share the same cultural background (on a linguistical, economical and most of all legal level). 
Since arbitration allows parties to appoint an adjudicator with a neutral nationality, the expected 
advantage is that neither party will benefit from “the home field advantage”. Practically, each 
party tends to appoint an arbitrator of the same nationality, or at least with a similar legal 
background. 
 
As far as confidentiality is concerned, arbitration hearings are not public and the award is not 
published, which allows a company to safeguard business secrecy, reputation and market value. 
It should be kept in mind that in investor-State arbitration, the procedure is public. In addition, 
when the award is challenged before state courts, it becomes public; not to mention that the new 
ICC Arbitration Rules of 2017 provide for the publication of the award (under several 
conditions).29 
 
Arbitration was conceived to allow flexibility and a tailor-made justice. Actually, parties can 
choose the applicable procedural rules and fix the procedural calendar. Nonetheless, arbitration 
procedures became very standardised and most arbitration rules are very detailed; there is no 
more room for customization. Even if in theory parties can choose to apply trade usages (the lex 
mercatoria) and grant arbitrators the power to rule ex aequo et bono, they rarely choose to do so, 
preferring a foreseeable solution. 
 
Despite the above-mentioned flaws, arbitration developed, notably with the entry into force of 
the New York Convention (see, infra, paragraphs 74-80). 
 
In fact, the New York Convention mechanism30 helped promoting arbitration especially for the 
following reasons: signatory parties undertook to give full effect to arbitration agreements by 
requiring courts to deny parties access to court and to refer the matter instead to an arbitral 
tribunal31. Unfortunately, the Singapore Convention does not contain a similar mechanism, 
mutatis mutandis (i.e. the obligation upon the courts to refer the matter to a mediator), whose 
purpose is to give full effect to the mediation clause.  
 
 
29  Updated Note to Parties and Arbitral Tribunals on the Conduct of the Arbitration under the ICC Rules of 
Arbitration (Note), 20 December 2018, §§ 40-46. 
 
30  Emmanuel Gaillard, Georges Andrew Bermann, The UNCITRAL Secretariat Guide on the New York 
Convention (UNCITRAL Secretariat, 2017). 
 
31  Article II of the New York Convention. 
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In addition, the New York Convention provides for: (i) an expedited and simple enforcement 
procedure32; (ii) limited grounds to refuse enforcement33 and (iii) the “most favourable law” 
provision.34 
 
2.3. Arbitration and Mediation35: the “pros and “cons”36 
 
Litigation is generally a method that people seek to avoid. It is expensive, time consuming, 
emotionally draining and unpredictable. Alternative dispute resolution, such as arbitration and 
mediation, became therefore very popular and the following table provides for a comparison 
between arbitration and mediation: 
 
 Arbitration Mediation 
Definition 
 
A process by which parties 
grant the power to a third 
neutral (the arbitrator) to 
adjudicate the dispute by 





The trial is replaced by an 
arbitration procedure 
A process by which parties  
attempt to solve their dispute 
by reaching a settlement 
agreement,  with the 
assistance of a neutral third 
party (the mediator), who 
does not hold the power to  
adjudicate the dispute37 
 
The trial is either avoided or 
stayed while awaiting the 
final outcome 
Common grounds Both are alternatives to traditional litigation 
Both resort to a neutral third party  
The award and the settlement agreement are both binding 
 
 
32  Article IV of the New York Convention. 
 
33  Article V of the New York Convention. 
 
34  Article VII of the New York Convention. Based on this Article, and under French law, an award that has 
been annulled in the state of seat can still be enforced in France. See in this respect the Putrabali case, 
French Cour de Cassation, 29 June 2007, N° 05-18.053. 
 
35  Loic Cadiet, Thomas Clay, Emmanuel Jeuland, Médiation et Arbitrage : Alternative Dispute Resolution - 
Alternative à la Justice ou Justice Alternative ? Perspectives Comparatives (Litec, 2005) ; René Sève, La 
Médiation (Archives de Philosophie du droit, n°61, 2019).  
 
36  Peter Binder, International Commercial Arbitration and Mediation in UNCITRAL Model Law Jurisdictions 
552 ff. (Kluwer Law International, 4th Ed, 2019). 
 
37  The Singapore Convention has the advantage of providing for a definition of mediation (article 2.3), 
whereas the New York Convention does not contain a definition of arbitration. 
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Role of the third neutral The arbitrator is empowered 




The arbitrator has jurisdictio 
but lacks imperium 
The mediator’s function is 
not to judge the case but to 
frame and facilitate 
negotiation38 
 
The mediator lacks both 
imperium and jurisdiction 
Different Method The arbitrator hears evidence 




Arbitration is similar to the 
court process, as it is 
adversarial and the parties 
file submissions and 
evidence (such as witness 
statements and expert 
reports) and give oral 
pleadings 
The process is a structured 
negotiation between the 
parties with the assistance of 
a neutral third party  
 
The mediator helps parties to 
reach a settlement by 
assisting them with 
communications, obtaining 
relevant information, and 
developing options39. The 
process is non-
confrontational and the 
mediator can meet with one 
party without the other. 
Common advantage Both mechanisms have over a trial the advantage of saving 
cost and time and provide parties with a greater degree of 
predictability in the outcome. Both mechanisms are 
confidential. 
Advantage Avoiding the risk that the 
parties will not agree and will 
end up in court anyway 
insofar as the arbitrator 
renders a legally binding 
award 
Both parties participate in 
resolving the dispute; they 
are more likely to carry out 
the settlement agreed upon 
parties retain control of the 
dispute resolution process. 
As such, mediation can help 
preserving good business 
relationship in view of future 
collaboration,when 
compared to other forms of 
dispute resolution mechanisms 




38  Mediation ends when settlement is reached or when parties are deadlocked. 
 
39  Although mediation procedures may vary, parties usually first meet together with the mediator informally 
to explain their views of the dispute. Then, the mediator often meets with each party separately. The 
mediator discusses the dispute with them, and explores with each party possible ways to resolve it. It is 
common practice for the mediator to go back and forth between the different parties until settlement is 
reached. 
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Common disadvantage These alternative procedures are not bound to follow legal 
precedent in coming to a decision and parties cannot count on 
legal precedent to be determinative of the result 
Disadvantage The fact that the arbitrator 
will settle the fate of the 
parties will inhibit them to 
share confidential 
information regarding their 
interests (unlike mediation) 
One or both parties may be 
dissatisfied with the result 
+ besoin d’exécuter? 
 
Parties may not be able to 
come together on an 




2.4. Will the Singapore Convention steal some (not to say all) of arbitration’s light? 
 
As stated above (see supra, paragraphs 1-2), the absence of a cross-border mechanism to enforce 
the settlement agreements resulting from mediation was seen as one of mediation’s major flaws. 
With the Singapore Convention, the purely private contractual agreement is granted a sui generis 
status, enforceable in all Contracting States, which is comparable to the status of arbitral awards 
under the New York Convention. Therefrom, the edge of arbitration could directly be eroded, 
considering that the enforceability of arbitral awards is usually ranked as arbitration’s most 
important feature40. In other words, the biggest fear of arbitration is losing its status as the most 
preferred form of alternative dispute resolution.  
 
It can however be noted that at several renowned arbitral institutions, the growing success of 
mediation has not dampened demand for arbitration services. This assumption arises from the 
fundamental differences between arbitration and mediation: arbitration is regarded as a 
“litigation-substitute”. Unlike arbitration, mediation is a non-confrontational process and allows 
parties to craft a business solution, rather than a technical one, thus preserving their on-going 
relationship. 
 




40  Ashutosh Ray, Is Singapore Convention to Mediation what New York Convention is to Arbitration? 31 
August 2019 Kluwer Arbitration Blog; Iris NG, The Singapore Mediation Convention: What Does it Mean 
for Arbitration and the Future of Dispute Resolution? 31 August 2019 Kluwer Arbitration Blog. 
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- Article 8 of the Singapore Convention allows Contracting States to express reservations 
as to the scope of application of the Convention41, the result of which is the exclusion of 
its application in investor-State disputes. By contrast, arbitral awards rendered in these 
types of disputes enjoy full enforceability and were not carved-out from the New York 
Convention’s scope of application.  
- The absence of a well-established legal framework on mediation in some of the 
Contracting States of the Singapore Convention comparable to the legal framework (and 
case law) on arbitration may drive parties to resort to arbitration instead, where solutions 
are more predictable. 
- The expedited procedures42 and the adoption of the Prague Rules43 can increase the time 
and cost efficiency of arbitration. 
- Recent arbitration acts allow parties to waive their right to challenge the award44. 
- Several arbitration centres45 offer “low cost” arbitration services. 
- A generation of young arbitrators and young practitioners who charge more reasonable 
fees is emerging. 
- Parties can sign strict confidentiality agreements. 
Parties are opting more and more for ad hoc arbitrations, which allows the procedure to be more 
personalized to their needs without being framed by institutional rules. 
 
2.5. Med-Arb: the best of both worlds? 
 
Instead of envisaging arbitration and mediation as competing dispute resolution mechanisms, the 





41  The opt-out regime allows a Party to the Convention not to apply it to settlement agreements to which it is 
a party, or to which any governmental agencies or any person acting on behalf of a governmental agency is 
a party, to the extent specified in the declaration and to apply this Convention only to the extent that the 
parties to the settlement agreement have agreed to the application of the Convention. 
 
42  For instance, the 2017 ICC arbitration rules, Appendix 6. 
 
43  See https://praguerules.com/upload/medialibrary/9dc/9dc31ba7799e26473d92961d926948c9.pdf. 
 
44  Article 32.11 of the 2016 SIAC rules; Article 35(6) of the 2017 ICC arbitration rules; Article 35 (2) of the 
2018 HKIAC rules; Article of 26.8 the 2014 LCIA rules. 
 
45  See, for instance, Delos Dispute Resolution, Chambre arbitrale de Paris, CRCICA, etc. 
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Actually, mediation and arbitration should not be contemplated as an “either-or” equation: there 
are various combinations of the two modes under arb-med, med-arb and arb-med-arb protocols 
(collectively referred to as AMA protocols), which are increasingly popular. 
 
Practically, arbitration and mediation can be combined at 3 different stages: 
 
- Before arbitration: mediation can be the first step towards resolving the dispute by 
attempting to find an agreement with the help of a mediator. If the parties do not reach an 
agreement during the mediation process (or if some issues remain outstanding) then 
parties can go to arbitration. The threat of having a third party settle the dispute is often 
an incentive for the parties to work extra hard in order to reach an agreement. The 
mediation pre-requirement cannot be circumvented insofar as the claim will be 
inadmissible before the arbitrator if the party does no establish that it attempted to 
mediate. In practice, escalation clauses (or multi-tiered dispute settlement mechanisms)46 
are becoming more and more frequent, notably in construction contracts.47 
 
- During arbitration: parties can reach a settlement pending arbitration and ask the Tribunal 
to render an award by consent. This settlement can be reached with or without the help of 
a mediator (who can be the arbitrator himself, even though this is a debatable issue). 
 
- After arbitration: mediation may be appropriate for parties in bifurcated proceedings after an 
award on liability or after the final award so that the parties can find a settlement regarding the 






46  Suggested Med-Arb Clause “Any dispute arising out of or in connection with this contract shall first be 
referred to mediation under the […] Mediation rules. If the mediation is abandoned by the mediator or is 
otherwise concluded without the dispute being resolved, then such dispute shall be definitively settled by 
arbitration under the […] Arbitration rules”. 
 
47  In this respect see the Dispute Adjudication Boards: the adjudicator renders a decision (like the arbitrator), 
but this decision is not technically an award and can only be implemented voluntarily by the parties (like 
the settlement agreement reached after a mediation). In case a party does not abide by the adjudicator’s 
decision, the issue will be referred to the judge or the arbitrator. Before the Singapore Convention, referring 
back to the judge was a way to enforce the settlement agreement. 
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To sum up, if the signing of the Singapore Convention will promote mediation by offering a 
uniform legal framework for the international enforcement of settlements resulting from 
mediation, it will not yet dampen the recourse to arbitration. The latter, even if eroded by its 
misuse, still enjoys a leading position in the dispute resolution mechanisms “market”. That being 
said, parties should consider combining both arbitration and mediation instead of opting for one 
mechanism as an “una via electa”. 
3. The impacts of the Singapore Convention on the use of mediation in business 
relationships worldwide  
 
The strength brought by the Contracting States to the Convention clearly puts conventional 
mediation in the spotlight on an international level and demonstrates that the Singapore 
Convention will impact business systems insofar as it is a solid tool for developing the use of 
mediation in business relationships. 
 
There are some fertile grounds for developing the use of mediation in business relationships 
through or under the impulse given by the Singapore Convention. Particular regions of the world 
(A.) and specific industries (B.) are favorable springboards to jump to more mediation in business 
relationships.  
 
3.1.  Regions of the world that could benefit from the Singapore Convention 
 
Three specific regions could benefit from the entry into force of the Singapore Convention: the 
Asia-Pacific area, the region covered by the BRI and Europe facing Brexit. 
 
Factors establishing the Asia-Pacific region as a fertile ground for developing the use of 
mediation in business relationships range from general considerations to more specific 
observations of the legislative context and commercial ecosystem. 
 
As general considerations, the facts that the signing of the Singapore Convention occurred in 
Singapore and that Singapore is the first signatory country to have ratified the Convention 
demonstrate both the growing influence of this country to be recognized as the worldwide hub 




Mediation is consistent with Asian sensibilities and culture for business. According to the 2014 
survey conducted by the IMI, 72% of in-house counsels and external counsels from the Asia-
Pacific region indicate that their company or firm generally had a positive attitude to mediation.  
 
Positive legislative environment also contributes to the positioning of the Asia-Pacific area as a 
fertile area for mediation. As examples of Asian countries that have actively promoted in their 
legislation the use of mediation in recent times, can be cited, among aothers: the People’ Republic 
of China, that enacted the 2012 amendment to China’s Civil Procedure Law who adopted the 
principle of “mediation first” in its Article 122; Hong Kong (which inherited its legal system 
from the UK) that issued the Mediation Ordinance (MO) in 2013 and the (first in the world) 
Apology legislation in 2017, adopted to facilitate the use of mediation by framing the 
circumstances for the parties expressing their apologies regarding a litigious situation without 
any downside on their legal rights; Malaysia, that promulgated the Malaysian Mediation Act in 
2012 (Act 749)48; Singapore, that issued the Mediation Act in 2017.49 
 
To focus on one of the two world’s largest economies, and one of the fourth largest economies 
in Asia, China’s approach to mediation is already quite sophisticated, where there are in general 
three mediation options for resolving commercial disputes: court mediation, mediation conducted 
in the course of arbitration proceedings (such as “med-arb”), and private mediation through 
professional third party mediation institutions (hereafter institutional commercial mediation), 
highly professionalized50.  
 
Commercial mediation ecosystem is also quite elaborated in the Asia-Pacific area. In Singapore, 
for example, major Centers offer a wide range of services, such as: the WIPO Arbitration and 
Mediation Center51, the Singapore Mediation Centre52 and the Singapore International Mediation 
Centre53, offering commercial mediation services; the Singapore International Mediation 
Institute54, working closely with IMI, serving as independent professional standards body; the 
Singapore International Dispute Resolution Academy, lodging research and training academy55. 
 
 
48  See, for further details, 
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/natlex4.detail?p_lang=en&p_isn=95605&p_country=MYS&p_count=199. 
49  See, for further details, https://sso.agc.gov.sg/Act/MA2017. 
50  See, for an extensive analysis, https://cris.maastrichtuniversity.nl/ws/portalfiles/portal/2718311/c5351.pdf. 
51  See, for further informations, https://www.wipo.int/amc/en/. 
52  See, for more details, https://www.mediation.com.sg/ 
53  See, for a deeper analysis, http://simc.com.sg/. 
54  See, fr more details, https://www.simi.org.sg/. 
55  See https://sidra.smu.edu.sg/. 
19/37 
Within this context, the Asia-Pacific area could gain interesting benefits from the implementation 
of the Singapore Convention. First, the Singapore Convention may and will certainly serve as an 
additional tool for the countries of this region of the world to structure and continue to develop 
business relationships by facilitating the management and the issues of the inevitable disputes 
arising. Second, the Convention may help Asian ADR institutions and centers to get greater 
recognition and visibility in the magic world of international commercial dispute resolution. This 
is even more true when facing the quite closed and already well-established world of arbitration. 
Third, by compelling the competent authorities to enforce settlement agreements resulting from 
mediation held in other countries, and thus, in other jurisdictions, and by restricting the grounds 
on which a foreign jurisdiction could decline enforcement, the Singapore Convention will favour 
cross-border enforcement of settlement agreements in this area, mainly where practices for 
enforcing foreign judgments are divergent. This will make the Singapore Convention a political 
and diplomatic tool to unify the area. 
 
If mediation is becoming a preferred method for dispute resolution in Asia, it has been primarily 
driven by China and the BRI56. Especially the latter phenomenon contributed to the development 
of international commercial mediation because of (i) the vast geographical impact of the BRI, 
which the World Bank estimates at over 70 countries, extended from the southern pacific to 
Europe, Africa and South America, (ii) the inevitable tendency to create cross-border disputes 
(iii) that must be settled as efficiently and quickly as possible. Interestingly, all disputes 
concerning the BRI and foreign compagnies are resolved through mediation by the International 
Commercial Expert Committee launched in 2018 by the Singapore International Mediation 
Centre and the China Council for the Promotion of International Trade. Thus, the Singapore 
Convention is considered as a stepping stone to the development of international dispute 
resolution in China. 
 
As far as Europe is concerned, before BREXIT, the impact of the Singapore Convention on 
European commercial transactions was not a specific subject as Europe benefits from tools for 
easily enforcing agreements resulting from cross-border mediation. As Great-Britain decided to 
exit from the European Union, enforcement of settlement agreements reached through mediation 
conducted in the UK between either multinational parties or between parties located in the UK 
 
 
56  It is worth mentioning that China had already expressed its support towards mediation during the Opening 
Ceremony of the Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation held on 14 May 2017, where the 
Chinese President XI JINPING pointed out the need of an “equitable and transparent system of 
international trade” and the global promotion of “mediation in the spirit of justice”.  
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should nowadays be considered in the same manner than the enforcement of settlement 
agreements resulting from international commercial mediation. Thus, the Singapore Convention 
could become a useful tool there as well. 
 
3.2.  Industries that could benefit from the Singapore Convention 
 
One particular sector which stands to benefit from the adoption of the Singapore Convention is 
probably the construction industry, as well as the energy and infrastructure projects. Construction 
contracts need timed and due performance. Main contractors however encounter numerous 
obstacles in the performance of their contract, claims arising at various stages of the life of the 
contract, as early as the procurement moment. The causes of the conflicts are various, resulting 
from either tight timescale, misunderstandings between what was expected and what is really 
built, errors in the contractual documentation, overcharging, overspending, overage, etc. The 
main economic actors such as subcontractors, final clients, including State-owned developer 
clients are always looking for a quick and efficient fix of the issues. If their contractual 
documentation often contents dispute resolution provisions, these provisions are very often 
confined in dispute boards and arbitration clauses. In fact, the decision makers – still baby-
boomers – consider more secure to adopt a traditional dispute resolution technique that will result 
in either an arbitral award or a court judgment, both of which are enforceable as a matter of law.  
 
The ratification of the Singapore Convention should change this international construction 
dispute resolution jigsaw. First, litigation or arbitration proceedings arising out of construction 
disputes are long and costly. Second, the baby-boomers are retiring from the business field. Third, 
actors in the chain of supplying the works may sometimes be small or weak, and may collapse 
or be bankrupted before a solution is reached through litigation or arbitration. The Singapore 
Convention fulfill the needs of rapidity, efficiency and enforceability which are key needs of the 
construction industry. And mediation techniques also offer to the parties a chance for restoring 
their relations and finding a solution for the works to be completed on time and within budget. 
 
The timing of the Convention for the construction community could not be better, not to mention 
the strict deadlines for Qatar to build infrastructure for the 2022 World Cup, for France to build 
infrastructure for the 2024 Olympics Games, or for Italy (Cortina d’Ampezzo and Milan) to 
realize the plants necessary to host the XXV Winter Olympic Games in 2026. Once into force, 
contractors bidding on new projects or closing out existing ones will welcome the Convention as 
an opportunity to settle their claims without the need for formal dispute resolution through courts 
or arbitration. Further to Qatar’ ratification of the Convention, representatives of Qatari ADR 
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Centers have already identified the interest for a Qatari enterprise to be able to enforce settlement 
agreements in an expedited manner under the Convention57. 
 
An increase of international transactions and, thus, of the application of the Singapore 
Convention could also rest on the development of the maritime business shape. International 
shipping disputes are now expected on the BRI maritime sea route, connecting China’s coastal 
regions with south east and south Asia, the South Pacific, the Middle East and Eastern Africa, all 
the way to Europe. The program is expected to involve over US$1 trillion in investments, 
including in infrastructure development for ports and networks.  
 
Mediation was already gaining recognition in the shipping industry before the signing of the 
Singapore Convention, as the english case Eleni Shipping Limited v Transgrain Shipping BV58 
well demonstrates. Indeed, in this English Commercial Court case, TEARE J reviewed the 
mediation provision contained in a Baltic and International Maritime Council (referred to as 
BIMCO) dispute resolution clause and made reference to the extensive acceptance of mediation 
as an effective dispute resolution tool used and to be used in the maritime industry. 
 
In addition to the above mentioned BIMCO’s Standard dispute resolution clause referring to 
mediation59, we can notice the evolution of the practice of the maritime arbitral institution of the 
London Maritime Arbitrators Association (referred to as LMAA)60. First, LMAA model 
arbitration clause provides for either party to elect to refer the dispute to mediation. Second, since 
 
 
57  Sheikh Dr Thani Hani Bin Ali, board member of the Qatar International Centre for Conciliation and 
Arbitration (QICCA), said on 13 March 2020 in a statement to Gulf Times, “if a Singaporean party to a 
mediated settlement has assets in Singapore or in any other Convention country, then the other party, such 
as a Qatari enterprise may be able to enforce the settlement agreement in an expedited manner under the 
Convention […] With the entrance of the Convention into application next September, […] in short, the 
Singapore Convention gives Qatari companies an additional reason to consider the role of mediation in an 
overall dispute resolution strategy, and in the event of a successful mediation, they must structure their 
mediated settlement agreements to take full advantage of the Convention,” available on https://www.gulf-
times.com/story/658334/Qatar-ratifies-Singapore-Convention-on-Mediation-s 
 
58  See Eleni Shipping Limited v Transgrain Shipping (The ELENI P) [2019] EWHC 910 (Comm). 
 
59  It should be underlined that BIMCO had recognised the value of mediation as early as 2001 and pushed 
throw its use by drafting the BIMCO mediation clause that was later incorporated into the BIMCO Dispute 
Resolution Clause 2017. According to this clause “the parties may agree at any time to refer to mediation 
any difference and/or dispute arising out of or in connection with this contract”. 
 
60  See http://www.lmaa.org.uk/terms-the-third-schedule.aspx. According to the LMAA model arbitration 
clause, one party serves upon the other a Mediation Notice. If a party does not agree to mediate, this element 
may be brought to the attention of the Tribunal when allocating costs. If the parties choose to try mediation, 
arbitration continues meanwhile. 
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the revision in 2017 of the LMAA Terms of arbitration, the parties are now asked to consider 
whether the case is suitable for mediation (2017 LMAA, Third Schedule61, question 18).  
 
The Terms of the maritime arbitral institution – the Singapore Chamber of Maritime Arbitration 
(referred to as SCMA)62 differ, although mediation is considered as a tool to the parties. SCMA 
Terms differs from the 2017 LMAA Terms as the SCMA model clause does not make per se 
reference to mediation.63 SCMA focuses more upon Med-Arb and Arb-Med-Arb clauses, whose 
features and potentialities have been addressed hereabove (see supra II. E)64. The SCMA Terms, 
such as the 2017 LMAA Terms, contain however a questionnaire referring to mediation. And in 
its Rule 41 relating to costs, it is also provided that the arbitral tribunal may take into account 
any unreasonable refusal by a party to participate in mediation.65 
 
To sum up, formal dispute resolution through courts or arbitration is, rightly or wrongly, 
perceived as being an hostile move, bad for business. Companies have already integrated the 
advantages of an amicable attempt to find a solution, strengthen or rebuild their businesses. Via 
the Singapore Convention, a contractor will be able to enforce any international commercial 
agreement resulting from mediation in the same way it could enforce an arbitral award, provided 
of course that the country in which it intends to enforce the settlement agreement has signed and 
ratified the Singapore Convention. Already in anticipation of 12 September 2020, contractors 
located either in Singapore, Fidji or Qatar and being in commercial transaction with counterparts 
located in one of these three countries can structure their dispute resolution clause or settlement 
agreements to benefit from Convention. With the important number of countries that have 
already signed and the increasing number that will ratify the Convention, business relationships 




61  The third schedule of the LMAA Terms 2017 is a 18 questions’ list.  The question directed to the parties 
regarding mediation is N°18 (the last one) and is asked in the following terms: “Have the parties considered 
whether mediation might be worthwhile?” 
 
62  See, fur further details, https://www.scma.org.sg/rules. 
 
63  For a comparative approach of LMAA and SCMA Terms on mediation, see, for example the public 
presentation of Mr. Chris Edwards, at Hill Dickinsen, available at 
https://www.scma.org.sg/SiteFolders/scma/387/Events/seminar20160429Slide.pdf. 
 
64  For exemples of the SCMA combined model clauses, see 
https://www.scma.org.sg/SiteFolders/scma/387/rules/rules_201510_eng.pdf. 
 
65  Rule SCMA 41.4. provides that: “When deciding which party shall bear the costs of the arbitration and the 
legal or other costs of the parties and the amounts of such costs, the Tribunal may take into account any 
unreasonable refusal by a party to participate in mediation”. 
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4. Is it possible to apply the Singapore Convention to investor-State disputes?  
 
4.1. The notion of investor-State dispute settlement and the current situation. 
 
Bearing in mind that the Convention, along with an accompanying instrument – the revised 
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (referred to as UNCITRAL) Mediation 
Model Law (referred to as Model Law)66 – was drafted with the principal aim to, on one hand, 
establish a framework for international settlement agreements that result from mediation, and, on 
the other hand, to promote mediation as a mainstream cross-border dispute resolution 
mechanism67, it is thus relevant for this study to address the issue of investor-State disputes 
settlement (referred to as ISDS). 
 
In February 2015, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (referred to as 
UNCTAD) released a study that revealed that in 2014, 42 appeals to the ISDS tribunals were 
filed by investors. In the same year, among the 356 cases decided, 37% were in favor of States 







66  UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Mediation and International Settlement Agreement 
Resulting from Mediation, 2018 (amending the UNICITRAL Model Law on International Commercial 
Conciliation, 2002, referred to as the 2002 Conciliation Model Law), Report of the U.N. Comm’n on Int’l 
Trade Law - Fifty-first session, U.N. Doc. A/73/17, annex II (2018). See Ellen E. Deason, What’s in a 
Name: The Terms Commercial and Mediation in the Singapore Convention on Mediation, in Singapore 
Mediation Convention Reference Book. Part III. In-Depth Consideration of Key Provisions, 4 Cardozo 
Journal of Conflict Resolution 1157 (2019), who underlines that “For the new Model Law, the Working 
Group amended the 2002 Conciliation Model Law to include a section on enforcement drawn from the 
Convention, and renamed the Model Law using the term Mediation. Overall, the new Mediation Model 
Law’s approach to the concept commercial is a new hybrid of the original Conciliation Model Law and the 
Singapore Convention. It did not, in general, alter the broad commercial scope of the original Conciliation 
Model Law”. 
 
67  Timothy Schnabel, The Singapore Convention on Mediation: A Framework for the Cross-Border 
Recognition and Enforcement of Mediated Settlements, 1 Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal 22 
(2019), who affirms that “The scope of the term [commercial dispute] could thus include at least some 
investor-State disputes in areas such as construction or national resource extraction”. 
 
68  Martina F. Ferracane, Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) Cases in the Asia-Pacific Region – The 
Record, in Asias’s Changing International Investment Regime 234 (Julien Chaisse, Tomoko Ishikawa, 
Sufian Jusoh, Singapore, 2017), who underlines that “The remaining 10 % of the cases were either 
discontinued for reasons other than settlement (8% of the cases) or a treaty breach was found but no 
monetary compensation was awarded to the investor (2% of the cases)”. See, furthermore, European 
Commission, Investor-to-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS). Some Facts and Figures, 12 March 2015, p. 6 
ff., available at https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/january/tradoc_153046.pdf. 
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At this stage it is worth briefly mentioning the context for an ISDS claim: an investor from one 
country (the “home State”) invests in another country (the “host State”), and both countries have 
agreed to ISDS. Should the host State breaches the rights safeguarded to the investor under a 
treaty that the former has signed, the latter may bring the matter before an arbitral tribunal. 
 
The ISDS or Investment Court System (referred to as ICS) is a system that allows the investors 
to sue States for alleged discriminatory practices. It is, therefore, an instrument of public 
international law, whose regulation is contained in several bilateral investment treaties, 
particularly in international trade treaties, such as the agreement between the United States of 
America, the United Mexican States, and Canada (referred to as USMCA). Many international 
investment agreements, such as the Energy Charter Treaty, refer to ISDS as a tool to settle 
controversies.  
 
International arbitration and the rules of the International Centre for Settlement of Investment 
Disputes of the World Bank (referred to as ICSID) are often coupled.69 Besides, international 
arbitral tribunals governed by different rules or institutions, such as the International Chamber of 
Commerce, the London Court of International Arbitration, the Hong Kong International 
Arbitration Centre, or the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, are often involved in this field. 
 
4.2. Towards the extension of mediation to Investment-State disputes 
 
The issue to be addressed is, therefore, to evaluate whether or not mediation – usually applicable 
in the context of international commercial disputes – could also apply to investment disputes, 
and in particular to ISDS.  
 
The issue was first debated in the context of international investment arbitration, and especially 
in the “Guide on Investment Mediation” (referred to as the Guide), and the training activity 
organized by the ICSID.70 Indeed, in July 2016, the “Energy Charter Conference” adopted the 
 
 
69  See, for further information, Julien Fouret, Rémy Gerbay, Gloria M. Alvarez (edited by), The ICSID 
Convention, Regulations and Rules. A Practical Commentary (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 
2019). 
 
70  Henry Abramson, Introduction, in Singapore Mediation Convention Reference Book. Part III. In-Depth 
Consideration of Key Provisions, cit., 1001, who affirms that the Singapore Convention “[…] is the product 
of a complex negotiation involving diverse parties from around the world. Parties brought to the room 
varied professional, cultural, and political perspectives and experiences. The result reflects 
“compromises”, a word with mixed and not always positive meanings […]. Compromise is often 
understood as an anemic conclusion to a quarrel, where the parties exhaustedly offer to “split the 
difference”. 
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Guide whose purpose was to encourage States and investors to consider mediation for investor-
State disputes. By going through the differences that exist between mediation rules and 
conciliation rules, the Guide covers several matters including, inter alia, the possible structure of 
mediation, the rules applicable to mediation process, and the enforceability of the resulting 
settlement agreement. Furthermore, in June 2017, ICSID held a particular training course for 
mediators tailored to investor-State disputes. In general terms, it could be easily argued that 
international arbitration has been preferred over international mediation, and this effect may 
derive mainly from the wide adoption of the New York Convention as a clear and stable 
framework for the recognition and enforcement of arbitral agreements and awards.  
 
Indeed, historically, mediation has not been widely spread in the resolution of international 
investment disputes, probably because once the agreement was reached through mediation, there 
was the risk of legal action before a national court or through arbitration in order to enforce the 
agreement. 
 
Therefore, it could be argued that the limited popularity of mediation in international investment 
disputes rests on the lack of enforceability of the settlement agreement. Indeed, although the 
reason behind this limited popularity is in reality quite difficult to grasp, it should be noted that 
the situation was identical in international arbitration before the full ratification of the New York 
Convention – whereby the issue of the enforceability of the awards has been resolved.71 Thus, is 
the success of arbitration for State investment disputes connected to the New York Convention? 
And if so, is it possible to extend the same assumption to the Singapore Convention and the 
international commercial mediation? 
 
If the described perspective is correct, the ratification of the Singapore Convention should 
operate as a tool to facilitate the use of mediation in both commercial and investment disputes, 
particularly in the field of the investor-State ones, operating as a mean that could be used not in 
alternative but in combination with other tools of alternative dispute resolution, as considered 
earlier (see, supra, paragraphs 46-47). Furthermore, the Convention and the Model Law could 
help to modify the domestic laws of the Contracting States mainly about the breach of contract 
claims and settlement agreements, and in so doing, contribute to increase the predictability, also 
at an internal level, for foreign commercial parties.  
 
 
71  Corinne Montineri, The United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNICITRAL) and the 
Significance of the Singapore Convention on Mediation, in Singapore Mediation Convention Reference 
Book. Part III. In-Depth Consideration of Key Provisions, cit., 1028. 
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As it will be better specified in the following (see, infra, paragraphs 105-115), it can also be 
noticed that a solution similar to the one following the adoption of the Singapore Convention 
could be the one related to the enforcement and recognition of court judgments that result from 
domestic litigation. In this respect, the Hague Conference on Private International Law has taken 
substantial steps to enact an international Convention to provide a framework under which parties 
will be required to recognize and enforce judgments rendered by a foreign court. The final draft 
of the Hague Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil or 
Commercial Matters (referred to as the Hague Judgments Convention) was completed, indeed, 
in late 2018, during the meeting of the Special Commission on the Recognition and Enforcement 
of Foreign Judgments, which was attended by 180 participants from 57 States.72 The diplomatic 
session that adopted the Hague Judgments Convention took place on 2 July 2019, and the Hague 
Judgments Convention open for signature. 
 
On the same ground, it is possible to assume that facilitating the use of international mediation 
through a uniform enforcement process relative to settlement agreements could lead the 
Singapore Convention and the Model Law to place mediation on the same level of arbitration 
and litigation as a way for international dispute resolution. A relevant contribution in the 
recognition of mediation at a global scale could be facilitated since mediation, as it has considered 
earlier (see, supra, paragraph 42), is often less expensive and faster than arbitration. Moreover, 
it is generally oriented in preserving the business relationship between the parties who may prefer 
to mediate their disputes once they have the guarantee that their settlement agreements can be 
enforced quickly.  
 
4.3. Towards the extension of the Singapore Convention’s scope to investor-State dispute 
settlement (ISDS) 
 
Despite the repeated references to “commercial relations” in the UN General Assembly 
Resolution, to “commercial disputes” “commercial practice” “commercial relationship” and 
“commercial parties” in the Preamble to the Convention, and to “commercial dispute” in Article 
1 of the Convention itself, the word “commercial” is nowhere defined in the Singapore 
 
 
72  A New Legal Framework for the Enforcement of Settlement Agreements Reached through International 





Convention.73 Neither was it defined in the 2002 Conciliation Model Law. However, the 
Convention, instead of embracing a broad interpretation of the word “commercial”, as reflected 
by the 2002 Conciliation Model Law, aims at ensuring a narrow scope of this concept. 
Nevertheless, rather than reaching this goal with a definition or examples, the Convention 
explicitly excludes from its scope settlement agreements on specific subjects, such as consumer 
transactions and matters of family, inheritance, or employment law [Article 1(2)].74 In this regard, 
it must be noted that the revision of the Model Law integrates the footnote present in the 
Conciliation Model Law with expansive illustrations of commercial activities.75 [Mediation 
Model Law, art. 16(2)]. 
 
Indeed, according to Article 1, the Singapore Convention will apply to all international 
agreements resulting from mediation and concluded in writing by parties to resolve commercial 
disputes, not specifying whether such agreements grant pecuniary or non-pecuniary measures. 
On the other hand, according to the Model Law – which was developed simultaneously along 
with the Singapore Convention and is relevant to understand whether the drafters of the 
Convention contemplated investor-State disputes or not – the first footnote states that the term 
 
 
73  Ellen E. Deason, What’s in a Name: The Terms Commercial and Mediation in the Singapore Convention 
on Mediation, in Singapore Mediation Convention Reference Book. Part III. In-Depth Consideration of 
Key Provisions, cit., 1149 ff., who, after having noted that prior to the deliberations that led to the Singapore 
Convention and the Mediation Model Law, UNCITRAL adopted the Model Law on International 
Commercial Conciliation (Conciliation Model Law) in 2002, whose main purpose was to provide legal 
mechanisms to protect the confidentiality of the process, affirms that the latter following the example of 
the previously prepared Model on International Commercial Arbitration (Arbitration Model Law) has 
explained the concept “commercial”, but through a footnote and not a specific Article. Therefore, footnote 
of Article 1 (Scope of application and definition, “This law applies to international commercial 
conciliation”), which contains an open-ended list of illustrations to convey the types of relationship that 
constitute commercial transaction, provides that “The term commercial should be given a wide 
interpretation so as to cover matters arising from all relationship of a commercial nature, whether 
contractual or not. Relationship of commercial nature include, but are not limited to, the following 
transaction: any trade transaction for the supply or exchange of goods or services; distribution agreement; 
commercial representation or agency; factoring; leasing; financing; construction of works, consulting; 
engineering; licensing; investment; financing; banking; insurance; exploitation agreement or concession; 
joint venture and other forms of industrial or business cooperation; carriage of goods or passengers by 
air, sea, rail, or road”. 
 
74  Ellen E. Deason, What’s in a Name: The Terms Commercial and Mediation in the Singapore Convention 
on Mediation, in Singapore Mediation Convention Reference Book. Part III. In-Depth Consideration of 
Key Provisions, cit., 1154, where the A. believe that “Perhaps the most crucial consideration […] was that 
consumer, employment, family, and probate disputes can involve parties with unequal bargaining power 
and less sophistication with legal proceedings. Thus, there was a danger that a broad scope for the concept 
commercial would create barriers to consensus on an efficient procedure and make the instrument less 
attractive to States considering its ratification”.  
 
75  Ellen E. Deason, What’s in a Name: The Terms Commercial and Mediation in the Singapore Convention 
on Mediation, in Singapore Mediation Convention Reference Book. Part III. In-Depth Consideration of 
Key Provisions, cit., 1157. 
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“commercial” should be given a broad interpretation and should cover all disputes arising out of 
both contractual or non-contractual commercial relationships. It also states that commercial 
relationships include “investment” transactions. Furthermore, the Working Group II’s suggestion 
to limit the scope of the Singapore Convention to “commercial agreements between businesses 
only” was not accepted by the delegates.76 The Working Group II also referred to Annex E of the 
ICSID (Additional Facility) Mediation Rules, which confirms that the Singapore Convention 
may apply to settlements reached in the context of investor-State disputes. It concluded that there 
could be “agreement to disagree”, and there is “room for interpretation” on the question of 
whether the Singapore Convention covers investor-State disputes. 
 
Therefore, is it possible to use mediation, in general, and the Singapore Convention, in particular, 
in investor-State disputes? If we argue otherwise, it would not have been necessary to include 
Article 8.1(a) in the Convention that states: “1. A Party to the Convention may declare that: (a) 
It shall not apply this Convention to settlement agreements to which it is a party, or to which any 
governmental agencies or any person acting on behalf of a governmental agency is a party, to the 
extent specified in the declaration […]”. 
 
In light of Article 8.1(a) of the Convention, it is noteworthy that the fact a government is allowed 
to exclude itself or its agencies from the application of the Convention when it is the party of a 
contractual relationship with an investor, reproduces, albeit in a somewhat different setting, the 
same rule as adopted by the drafters of the Hague Judgments Convention.77 However, at the same 
 
 
76  Surya Kapoor, Singapore Convention Series: How Does The Singapore Mediation Convention Affect 
International Dispute Resolution? ISDS Perspective Kluwer Mediation Blog, available at 
http://mediationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2019/11/15/singapore-convention-series-how-does-the-
singapore-mediation-convention-affect-international-dispute-resolution-isds-perspective/ (last visited 28 
February 2020). 
 
77  According to the Hague Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil or 
Commercial Matters, 2 July 2019, 1144 U.N.T.S. 249, “1. A State may declare that it shall not apply this 
Convention to judgments arising from proceedings to which any of the following is a party-(a) that State, 
or a natural person acting for that State; or (b) a government agency of that State, or a natural person 
acting for such a government agency. The State making such a declaration shall ensure that the declaration 
is no broader than necessary and that the exclusion from scope is clearly and precisely defined. The 
declaration shall not distinguish between judgments where the State, a government agency of that State or 
a natural person acting for either of them is a defendant or claimant in the proceedings before the court of 
origin. 2. Recognition or enforcement of a judgment given by a court of a State that made a c declaration 
pursuant to paragraph 1 may be refused if the judgment arose from proceedings to which either the State 
that made the declaration or the requested State, one of their government agencies or a natural person 
acting for either of them is a party, to the same extent as specified in the declaration”. See J. Landbrecht, 
Commercial Arbitration in the Era of the Singapore Convention and the Hague Court Conventions, in 37 
ASA Bulletin 871 ff (2019).  
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time, Article 8.1(a) represents an exception to the legal framework of the New York Convention 
in which such exclusion is not provided for.78  
 
In any case, and as already highlighted above, the hope is that the Singapore Convention, 
regardless of some exceptions to its direct application to some cases, will make mediation more 
appealing through specific and harmonized rules whose target is to make enforcement of what 
could be described as “international mediated settlement agreements (IMSAs)”79 easier and faster 
to obtain. The reasons behind the reservation of Article 8.1(a) were various, although the 
prominent factor was that in some jurisdictions, government entities are not allowed to conclude 
mediated settlements.80 Moreover, governments might become involved in disputes where the 
subject matter is particularly sensitive (i.e. national security), or with foreign policy 
implications.81  
 
Even if these dilemmas are partially resolved by making an explicit reference to sovereign 
immunity in the context of enforcement of awards that result from investor-State dispute 
arbitration,82 it is possible that the drafters of the Convention felt that providing some flexibility 
in the adoption of its regime could be probably better than excluding these matters entirely from 
the scope of the Convention. For some States, the solution adopted could be considered as an 
essential aspect in deciding whether to join the Convention or not.83 Indeed, addressing the issue 
through a reservation appeared to be preferable to a blunt exclusion of government-related 
mediated settlements, but notwithstanding the concerns noted above, some government entities 
which engaged in commercial activities may still wish to resort to the Singapore Convention to 
 
 
78  Robert Morgan, The Singapore Convention on Mediation: A Commentary, 22 Asian Dispute Review 41 
(2020). 
 
79  Elisabetta Silvestri, The Singapore Convention on Mediated Settlement Agreements: A New String to the 
Bow of International Mediation, in 3 Access to Justice in Eastern Europe 5 (2019). 
 
80  UNCITRAL Rep. of Working Group II (Arbitration and Conciliation) on the work of its 63rd Sess. (7-11 
September 2015), 49th Sess., A/CN.9/861, para. 44 (2015).  
 
81  Itai Apter, Coral Henig Muchnik, Reservations in the Singapore Convention – Helping to Make “The New 
York Dream” Come True, in Singapore Mediation Convention Reference Book. Part III. In Depth 
Consideration of Key Provisions, cit., 1273. 
 
82  Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States, arts. 
54-55 (the ICSID Convention), Oct. 14, 1966, 575 U.N.T.S. 159. 
 
83  As an illustration, two countries signed the Convention while expressing upon signature reservation as to 
the application of its Article 8.1(a): the Republic of Belarus and the Islamic Republic of Iran. 
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enforce settlements reached through mediation.84 Therefore, Article 8.1(a) fine-tunes the balance 
between these competing concerns by encouraging States wishing to make a reservation to limit 
the Convention’s application to subject matters that are strictly necessary.85  
 
Further proof of this flexibility derives from the way in which the Convention’s regime could be 
practically adopted, considering the Contracting States, for instance, could be allowed to declare 
whether any reformed dispute resolution mechanism provides an additional choice 
(supplementing existing investor-State provisions in their investment treaties) or an exclusive 
choice (entirely replacing such provisions86).  
 
Simultaneously, Article 8.1(a)’s reservation could operate as a deterrent for private parties to 
mediate an international settlement agreement with States, generating a negative impact on the 
spread of the use of mediation in the international context insofar as States today operate as 
relevant actors in the global commercial community both in contractual and investment contexts.  
As a result, the actual regime stimulates the concern that some States will be required to choose 
between rejecting the Singapore Convention or accepting it in order to support the use of 
settlements reached by mediation in international disputes and, as an effect, exposing themselves 
to expedited enforcement procedures. It is difficult to understand what choices States will make, 
even in the presence of States that envisage the use of mediation as a valuable alternative to 
courts or international arbitration. Despite its limiting effect, Article 8.1(a)’s reservation may be 
fundamental in promoting wider participation of States in the Convention and, as a consequence, 
users will benefit from the Convention as they seek legal status and a global enforcement of their 
international settlements resulting from mediation. A specialized doctrine has pointed out that 
various States, including the European Union and Canada, have raised concerns with ISDS, 
including the high cost and time, the lack of consistency and predictability in arbitral awards and 




84  Timothy Schnabel, The Singapore Convention on Mediation: A Framework for the Cross-Border 
Recognition and Enforcement of Mediated Settlements, cit., 43. 
 
85  Itai Apter, Coral Henig Muchnik, Reservations in the Singapore Convention – Helping to Make “The New 
York Dream” Come True, in Singapore Mediation Convention Reference Book. Part III. In Depth 
Consideration of Key Provisions, cit., 1274. 
 
86  United Nations Commission on International Trade Law Working Group III, Possible Reform of Investor-
State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) Multilateral Instrument on ISDS Reform 5 (New York, 2020). 
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The consequences of these concerns have led the UNCITRAL Working Group III - Investor-
State Dispute Settlement Reform (referred to as Working Group III) to propose the development 
of a broad directive to reform the ISDS, and the relative discussion has continued to advance, 
also during the third phase of the Working Group III’ negotiations (October 2019).  
 
Some States have advocated for systemic reform, which includes the possible creation of a 
permanent multilateral court to adjudicate investor-State disputes [see European Commission, 
Trade Policy Committee (Services and Investment), Working Group III, at 1, WK 3675/2018 
INIT (Mar. 26, 2018)]. Still, this solution is debatable, and above all, this reform will not 
materialize overnight, others have argued for incremental reform, which may not go far enough.  
International mediation could emerge as a mechanism to overcome some frustrations associated 
with both commercial and investment arbitrations, which could be complementary to the current 
Working Group III’ negotiations irrespective of the approach ultimately adopted by the body. It 
is possible to assume this idea because, in general, the Singapore Convention potentially extends 
to investor-State disputes so long as they relate to a commercial matter.  
 
At a practical level, it is undoubtful that the promotion of the Singapore Convention and, more 
generally of mediation may stimulate parties to use better the cooling-off periods provided for 
under many investment treaties. Indeed, claimants often do not take into account that by the time 
the relevant notice of dispute has been transmitted to the appropriate ministry and been vetted, 
the negotiation period has lapsed. Once a request for arbitration has been made public, the 
position of the parties often hardens as public criticism could result from a settlement. Attempting 
to bypass the amicable negotiation period could serve as a missed opportunity in many cases. 
Therefore, an extensive application of international mediation in these areas as well could lead 
to an improvement in this kind of dispute. 
 
At a broader level, the framework for mediation of investor-State arbitration already exists, 
although it is not such a comprehensive enforcement mechanism so far. Therefore, the 
International Bar Association Investor-State Mediation Rules has already built a legal framework 
to regulate mediation in the investor-State disputes’ context, offering a helpful starting point for 
parties interested in pursuing mediation in this field. Not to mention the fact that the conciliation 
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processes provided for under the ICSID87 and UNCITRAL, although the first one has proposed 
some rule amendments that would create a separate set of mediation rules.88 
 
Moreover, it is worth to underline that an enforcement mechanism (the lack of which was the 
concern in the commercial context) also exists under specific rules. Indeed, if the parties reach 
an amicable settlement through mediation, they may request that the tribunal incorporates the 
reached solution into a consent award under ICSID Arbitration Rule 43(2).89 Nevertheless, in 
this case, we face a procedure that still requires the parties to commence and fund the arbitration 
process, at least until the tribunal is constituted and has rendered the consent award. If an arbitral 
tribunal were to be formed after a settlement agreement is reached, some courts have found that 
such consent awards are not enforceable because there was no “dispute” before the tribunal for 
jurisdiction.90 
 
Furthermore, mediation is already being encouraged in investor-State disputes, and the 
Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement, which came into force in 2017, represents an 







87  More to the point, the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (“ICSID”) is an evident 
example of an institution that recognizes both mediation and conciliation operating a distinction between 
them. The ICSID Rules of Procedure for Conciliation Proceedings indicate conciliators’ functions whose 
tasks include clarifying the disputed issues, and in so doing, they are instructed to hear both parties and to 
try to obtain any information that may further this goal. The promotion of an agreement between the parties 
legitimate the conciliators to make recommendations to the parties that may include specific terms for 
settlement or requests that during the conciliation the parties refrain from specific acts, which could 
aggravate the dispute, and conciliators operate to point out to the parties the arguments in favor of their 
recommendation. See ICSID CONVENTION, Regulations, and Rules, Part E, R. 22, available at 
http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/icsid/staticfiles/basicdoc/basic-en.htm (last visited 8 March 2020).  
 
88  If the amendments are approved as currently drafted, the mediation rules will describe the mediator’s role 
as simply direct to assist the parties “in reaching a mutually acceptable resolution” of their dispute. 
Furthermore, they will specify that the mediator does not have authority to impose a settlement and shall 
treat the parties in an equitable way.  
 
89  ICSID Arbitration Rule 43(2) provides that “if the parties file with the Secretary-General the full and signed 
text of their settlement and in writing request the Tribunal to embody such settlement in an award, the 
Tribunal may record the settlement in the form of its award”.  
 
90  See, e.g., Castro v. Tri Marine Fish Co. LLC, 921 F.3d 766, 772–76 (9th. Cir. 2019) finding that a settlement 
agreement that was reached by parties, who then composed a tribunal to convert the settlement agreement 
into an arbitral award, did not “transform” the agreement into an arbitral award that could be enforced under 
the New York Convention. 
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Indeed, as a matter of fact, in 2016, the Republic of the Philippines agreed to mediate a dispute 
with Systra SA and its local subsidiary Systra Philippines Inc. arising out of allegedly long 
overdue invoices for services and work performed on infrastructure projects (including metro 
and rail projects) for various government agencies of the Philippines.91 The dispute was filed 
under the France-Philippines bilateral investment treaty. It appeared to have been the first time 
in which an investor and a host-State used the International Bar Association Rules to solve an 
investment dispute.92 
 
Lastly, and probably most significantly, although not expressly stated in the Singapore 
Convention, the latter would not apply to settlement agreements that contain exclusive 
jurisdictional clauses referring disputes regarding the settlement terms to arbitration as this would 
conflict with the New York Convention. This inapplicability to the settlement agreements that 
contain exclusive jurisdiction clauses may determine a limitation to the Singapore Convention’s 
use in practice.  
 
Therefore, if the legal counsels negotiating and concluding settlements on behalf of their clients 
would and should advise them to insert exclusive jurisdiction clauses (and better yet, arbitration 
clauses) into any settlement agreement to ensure predictability of fora for any dispute arising 
thereunder and to limit the risk of parallel proceedings, the insertion of such an arbitration clause 
would mean that most settlement agreements would fall outside the scope of the Singapore 
Convention in favor of the New York Convention. That is unless counsel inserted carefully 
drafted clauses providing for the Singapore Convention’s application in certain circumstances in 
such way that any dispute arising from or relating to the settlement agreement will be resolved 
by international arbitration under a specified law unless the location where a party serves to 
challenge the validity of the settlement agreement or enforce it, is a Contracting State to the 
Singapore Convention. Careful attention will have to be paid to drafting such clauses - as well as 







91  Christina G. Hioureas, The Singapore Convention on International Settlement Agreements Resulting from 
Mediation: A New Way Forward? 37 Berkeley Journ. of International Law 223 (2019). 
 
92  Christina G. Hioureas, cit., 223. 
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In light of the above, and irrespective of whether the Singapore Convention will be used in 
practice according to its inapplicability to settlement agreements that, besides certain subjects 
such as consumer transactions and matters of family, inheritance or employment law [Article 
1(2)], contain agreements to arbitrate or exclusive jurisdictional clause, its benefits are 
undoubtably in investor-State disputes also operating in this specific area as a “game-changer” 
in international dispute resolution.93  
 
For instance, as shown by the few ICSID conciliation proceedings held so far, mediation could 
reduce costs in searching the backgrounds of arbitrators and negotiating with the other side to 
reach an agreement on the chairperson, because the selection of only one mediator is needed and 
the role of the mediator is not to opine on the law or the merits of the dispute.94 In this regard, a 
not secondary relevance in the success of the Singapore Convention in ISDS should also be 
attributed to the provisions related to disclosure (art. 5.1(f) of the Singapore Convention) and its 
consequences in terms of facilitating the definition of the controversies.95  
 
To sum up, Singapore Convention, which operates with mediation in the same way in which the 
Convention of New York operates with arbitration, could be considered as a useful tool to spread 
the use of mediation in all types of commercial disputes, including the particular hypothesis of 
the investor-State dispute settlement. Indeed, there are not restrictions that can be invoked to 
impede this extension, and Article 8.1(a) should be considered as a way to give more flexibility 
to the States. This flexibility, indeed, would encourage them to sign and ratify the Convention 
and become potential parties of disputes that can be settled via mediation and, consequently, 
governed by a harmonized legal framework for the right to invoke settlement agreements as well 





93  Robert Morgan, The Singapore Convention on Mediation: A Commentary, cit., 41. 
 
94  Christina G. Hioureas, The Singapore Convention on International Settlement Agreements Resulting from 
Mediation: A New Way Forward? 37 Berkeley Journal of International Law 224 (2019). 
 
95  Ana Maria M. Goncalves, François Bogacz, Daniel Rainey, Beyond the Singapore Convention: The 
Importance of Creating a Code of Disclosure to Make International Commercial Mediation Mainstream, 
6 International Journ. of Online Dispute Resolution 164 ff. (2019).  
 
96  United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, United Nations Convention on International 
Settlement Agreements Resulting from Mediation (New York, 2018) (the «Singapore Convention on 





5.1. The Singapore Convention will alter the landscape of dispute resolution in the 
forthcoming years 
 
Whereas the elaboration of a Convention on mediation in such a short period of time (2015-2019) 
appeared dubious and implausible in the beginning, the converging wills of the Contracting 
States proved the contrary. Thus, today, five years after the inception of the project, the Singapore 
Convention came to light and will enter into force as of 12 September 2020.  
 
More precisely, the Singapore Convention, signed already by 52 states and ratified by 4 
(Singapore, the Fiji Islands States, Qatar and Saudi Arabia) can be seen as the missing piece of 
the international dispute resolution jigsaw.  
 
It is undoubtable that in the upcoming years, the Convention will radically alter the landscape of 
alternative dispute resolution and promote mediation in cross-border transactions and disputes. 
Ultimately, the Singapore Convention may serve as the rule of law to incentivize the uniformity 
of domestic legislation on contractual interpretation. Landscapes of alternative dispute resolution 
however differ whether European cross-border or international cross-border transactions are 
concerned. 
 
As a reminder, Europe took in 2018 an important step towards supporting cross-border mediation 
and the recognition and enforcement of cross-border mediated settlement agreements.97 As a 
consequence, where the EU Directive in Civil and Commercial Matters applies (parties located 
in the EU), cross-border agreements resulting from mediation are enforceable by a type of order 
called a “mediation settlement enforcement order” should both parties so request.98 On the other 
hand, where the EU Directive in Civil and Commercial Matters does not apply (e.g. mediations 
between parties outside the EU, or with one or more party outside the EU), settlement agreements 
resulting from mediation will be enforceable such as mere contracts in the countries that have 
not signed and ratified the Singapore Convention.  
 
 
97  These include mechanisms related to the 2008 Directive 2008/52/EC on certain aspects of mediation in 
civil and commercial matters (referred to ask the EU Directive in Civil and Commercial Matters), the Rome 
I Regulation and the Brussels Regulation. 
 
98  The practical way to deal with this in cross-border settlement agreements is, for example, by way of 
inserting in the mediation settlement agreement an enforceability clause either by court approval 
(homologation) or certification by a public notary. 
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Indeed, the international conventions (not mentioning the European context) in force before the 
signing of the Singapore Convention were dedicated to either litigation (the Hague Convention 
on the Choice of Court Agreement and the Hague Judgments) or to arbitration (the New York 
Convention), but not to mediation. 
 
5.2. Interactions between mediation and arbitration  
 
With the signing of the Singapore Convention, we may now face two scenarios:  
 
- either a litigation or an arbitration has already been initiated before the competent 
authority, and settlement agreements resulting from mediation may be recorded as part of 
those proceedings and potentially be enforced in trial as a judgment or in arbitration as an 
award by consent, or 
 
- neither litigation nor arbitration has been initiated, and the Singapore Convention will 
complete the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements and the New York 
Convention. 
 
The Singapore Convention will positively alter the current legal practices especially in the 
construction and shipping industries. The complexity of these two areas and the technical issues 
that may arise therefrom make mediation the most appropriate means of resolution of such cross-
border disputes, the Singapore Convention being the decisive tool of facilitating the enforcement 
of the agreements reached throughout the process. In that context, the geographical and economic 
regions which may mainly benefit from the Singapore Convention are the Asia-Pacific region, 
the regions affected by the Belt and Road Initiative and Europe facing Brexit. All these above-
mentioned regions face a multifaceted and fluctuating reality and are called to deal with cross-
border conflicts requiring a solid and comprehensive enforcement mechanism.  
 
As it has been pointed out in this paper, further benefits of the Singapore Convention on 
mediation may be examined vis-à-vis international arbitration. In fact, mediation offers all the 
advantages of arbitration and, in addition, it has the benefit of being more time and cost efficient 
alongside with being a non-adversarial process, which helps safeguarding good business relations 
in view of future collaboration.99  
 
 
99  Christina G. Hioureas, The Singapore Convention on International Settlement Agreements Resulting from 
Mediation: A New Way Forward, 37 Berkeley Journal of International Law 224 (2019). 
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In this context, considering that the Singapore Convention offers a mechanism for enforcement, 
it can be argued that parties would not be burdened with the need to engage the arbitral process 
to convert a settlement agreement into a consent award to guarantee enforcement. Hence, under 
these circumstances, arbitration might not remain the most privileged dispute resolution 
mechanism in the international landscape.  
 
However, it has been demonstrated that while at first glance international mediation and 
arbitration seem incompatible, their combination is not only an increasingly popular practice but 
a smart way to benefit from the advantages of both methods. Thus, even where mediation does 
not replace arbitration, it can still supplement arbitral processes by refining the issues to be 
addressed in the arbitral proceeding. One can note that the Singapore Convention has been added 
in the United Nations Treaty Collection as the 4th instrument available in the Chapter XXII, the 
title of which is “Commercial Arbitration and Mediation”100. 
 
As regards the ratione materiae of the Convention, its extension to investor-State disputes could 
increase the diffusion and appeal of international mediation at a global level as a general tool of 
alternative dispute resolution. In parallel, it would be able to operate as a real complementary or 
alternative instrument also in the field of international investment arbitration. Such extension is 
likely to increase legal security and predictability with regard to foreign commercial parties and 
thus, establish a uniform legal regime in that respect. 
 
The question remains whether the Singapore Convention will be as successful as the New York 
Convention. Facts show that the odds are in favour of such success insofar as 46 States has signed 
it once it opened for signature on 7 August 2019, in comparison to the 10 States that has signed 
the New York Convention when it was enacted on 10 June 1958.  
 
 
100  See, for further details, https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXII-
4&chapter=22&clang=_en; The 3 other instruments inserted in Chapter XXII are the New-York 
Convention, the European Convention on International Commercial Arbitration (Geneva) of 21 April 1961 
and the United Nations Convention on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor state Arbitration (New-York) 
of 10 December 2014. 
